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WHAT CAN COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES LEARN 
FROM FEMINIST LEGAL THEORIES IN THE ERA OF 
GLOBALIZATION 
Dr. Dana Raigrodski, University of Washington School of Law* 
This article re-examines the field of comparative law and 
comparative legal studies through the lens of feminist legal 
theories/studies (FLT). It suggests that lessons learned from the 
development of FLT and insights from shared epistemology and 
methodology within FLT can inform the ongoing controversies within 
comparative legal studies and provide comparative legal scholars 
and practitioners with the tools to maximize the benefits of 
comparative legal studies in the era of increasing global 
interdependence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years of planning and teaching Comparative Law 
Seminar (renamed Comparative Legal Studies Seminar), I often 
struggle to explain to myself and to the students what the course is 
about and what our learning objectives are. It is similarly difficult to 
find reading materials that successfully answer those questions. 1 
Much of both classical and contemporary comparative legal 
scholarship side-steps those issues altogether or addresses them 
briefly at best. Additionally, amongst the contemporary comparative 
law scholars that have raised key existential questions on the nature 
of the discipline few have been able to provide satisfactory answers. 
While scholars have tried to offer critical perspectives on 
comparative practice, that scholarship has mostly been invisible 
among mainstream comparativists, and not too many critical "new 
voices" have emerged since the two symposia issues published in 
1997 and 1998 by the Utah Law Review and the American Journal of 
Comparative Law respectively. 2 
1. At least amongst U.S. scholarship or other English based scholarship. See 
COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK (Esin Oriici.i & David Nelken, eds., 2007). 
2. In October 1996, the University of Utah College of Law sponsored the Utah Law 
Review Symposiwn entitled "New Approaches to Comparative Law." Symposiwn, 
New Approaches to Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 255, 255 (1997) 
[hereinafter Symposiwn, New Approaches to Comparative Law]. Also in 1996 and 
1997, two conferences at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor and a year later at 
the Hastings College of Law resulted in a symposium issue on "New Directions in 
Comparative Law" published by the American Journal of Comparative Law. See 
Symposium, New Directions in Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 597, 598-99 
(1998) [hereinafter Symposiwn, New Directions in Comparative Law]. A 2009 
symposium issue published by Brigham Young University Law Review on "Evaluating 
Legal Origins Theory" continues the strand of mainstream comparative legal 
scholarship focused on comparative economics developed within law and economics 
scholarship. See Symposium, Evaluating Legal Origin Theory, 2009 BYU L. REv. 
1413 (2009). Two other recent symposia organized by the American Society of 
Comparative Law offer some better approaches in problematizing key issues within 
comparative law discourse: Euro-centrism and methodology. The 2008 Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of Comparative Law, held at the University of 
California, Hastings College of the Law, focused on "The West and the Rest in 
Comparative Law." Several of the conference papers were later published in Volwne 
32 of the Hastings International and Comparative Law Review. See 32 HASTINGS 
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 379, 765 (2009). The 2009 American Society of Comparative 
Law's Annual Conference, held at the Roger Williams University School of Law, 
similarly examined issues facing new and young comparativists, especially on 
methodological concerns. Proceedings from that conference were published in 
Volwne 16 of the Roger Williams University Law Review. See 16 ROGER WILLIAMS 
U. L. REv. 1, 86 (2011). Neither issue, however, offers significant new lines of 
inquiry to address these issues. Lastly, a 2007 comparative law textbook, including 
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At the same time, and maybe partially due to the lack of 
satisfactory answers to these key questions, numerous comparative 
law projects today all around the world proceed with a very 
pragmatic practical stance and with very little theorizing about the 
meaning of engaging in a comparative endeavor. While this article 
does not suggest that we cannot engage in comparative inquiry 
without understanding the broader theoretical implications, it does 
suggest that developing such theory can both problematize the uses of 
comparative law, as well as better facilitate its various uses. 
In thinking anew about comparative law and comparative legal 
studies, I found myself drawing comparisons between the state of 
comparative law discourse and practice and the ongoing debates and 
controversies amongst feminist legal scholars with whom I have 
aligned in prior scholarship. Issues of substance versus method, 
similarities and differences, essentialism and imperialism, the 
production of knowledge and political dimensions are core to both 
areas. Yet, while these issues have either been marginalized in 
comparative law discourse or have simply bogged down further 
development of comparative law theory, feminist legal scholars have 
not only tackled these issues head on but have also developed 
promising new approaches to move us forward. Consequently, this 
article looks at comparative legal studies expressly through the lens 
of feminist legal theories/studies (FLT).4 It attempts to look fresh at 
some of the key questions posed by comparative scholars and answer 
contributions from mostly European contributors, attempts to offer nuanced analysis 
of contemporary problems in comparative legal studies. COMPARATIVE LAW: A 
HANDBOOK, supra note 1. 
3. Several of the then "new voices" represented in the 1997 Utah Symposium have no 
doubt brought the tools of feminist, critical, and post-colonial theories into the work 
of comparative law, and their ideas are utilized significantly in this article. See 
Symposium, New Approaches to Comparative Law, supra note 2. At the same time, 
fifteen years later, this work is yet to inform and transform contemporary comparative 
law work. With the state of comparative law in even more need of urgent care 
nowadays, this paper seeks to re-energize critical comparative law by tying their 
concepts together and broadening them through a concerted effort to link with current 
feminist legal theories. See discussion infra Parts II-VI. 
4. See discussion infra Parts II-VI. While this field of inquiry is widely known as 
feminist legal theories (FL T), the term "feminist legal studies" more accurately reflect 
the feminist insight that theory and practice inform and constitute each other. FL T in 
particular is informed by the real lived experiences of women, and challenges the 
epistemology of abstract theoretical knowing. 
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them by learning from the experience of FL T scholarship and 
practice.5 
Part II begins by briefly reviewing key controversies and critiques 
within comparative legal studies. It highlights the debate on whether 
comparative law encompasses a substantive area of law or is merely a 
method of inquiry, to suggest that FLT's efforts to move beyond 
similar dichotomies can help comparative legal studies regain 
relevance both in theory and in practice. It raises the question of 
whether comparativists should focus on similarities or differences 
amongst legal systems and the problems presented by comparative 
law's struggle with the relationship between relativism/multi-
culturalism and universalism, especially in light of tensions between 
the "West" and the "Rest" and despite efforts to infuse comparative 
legal studies with attention to historical, social, and political contexts. 
Similarly, Part II highlights an area of more recent critique among 
comparativists regarding comparative law's traditional focus on 
private law areas. The article will argue in later parts that FLT 
deconstruction of binary dualisms such as similarity versus difference 
and private versus public can bring important insights to these 
concerns within comparative legal studies. 
Part III offers a critical examination of comparative law's treatment 
of similarities and differences and brings to the forefront a discourse 
of the "Other." It relies on feminist and critical race theories' 
challenges to the social and legal construction of sameness and 
difference-challenges to the dichotomization of self and other-in 
order to assist comparative law in unpacking otherness. It calls on 
comparativists to recognize that similarities and differences are not 
mere observable facts but are to a large extent socially construed and, 
more importantly, in the service of certain ideologies and political 
agenda. Part IV complements Part III by examining the essentialist 
and ethnocentric stance from which most comparativists have 
construed similarities and differences. It suggests that comparativists 
can negotiate both essentialism and relativism by adopting feminist 
approaches calling for consciousness-shifting and fluid positioning 
that intentionally sees the world from multiple points of view. 
Part V consequently offers a broader critique of the stance of 
universal objectivity that comparative law often presupposes and 
perpetuates, and builds on feminist jurisprudence about the 
5. Cf Adrien Katherine Wing, Conceptualizing Global Substantive Justice in the Age of 
Obama, 13 J. GENDER RAcE & JUST. 705, 711 (2010) (arguing that comparative law, 
among other subfields of public international law, stands to benefit from critical race 
theories). 
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production of knowledge and objectivity as epistemology. It 
challenges the dichotomy between knowledge (substance) and how 
we come to know (methodology/epistemology) and exposes its 
connection to oppressive male power and ideology. It suggests that 
comparative work can benefit greatly from a critical attitude towards 
alleged universal categories and claims to authenticity by questioning 
the neutrality of the comparison and by taking account of the impact 
of the self and the observer's perspective and experience on our 
comparisons. 
Finally, Part VI calls for acknowledging comparative law as 
political practice, whether in the ways in which it "finds" similarities 
and differences and uses them to legitimize certain legal frameworks, 
or in the ways in which it construes and perpetuates private law, the 
distinction between private and public, and law in general as a-
political, non-ideological, and divorced from power structures within 
society. It uses FLT's explicit discourse oflaw as political practice, 
as an ideology of power, to call on those engaged in comparative 
legal studies and in comparative projects to be self-critical and 
recognize the power relations involved, whether we engage in 
harmonization and rule of law projects or in the seemingly mere 
intellectual projects ofunderstanding and migration of ideas and legal 
concepts. 
II. COMPARATIVE LAW IN CRISIS 
"Comparative law has often been criticized for lacking in theory, 
Euro-centric, and black-letter-law and private law oriented," states 
the preface of a current handbook on comparative law.6 Others 
observe that "comparative law is in need of an overhaul. "7 Yet, as 
evident from numerous academic courses, scholarly articles, and field 
projects, "[i]n our increasingly globally linked world, comparative 
law needs to take on an ever more important role. "8 
Critics of the current state of comparative law abound, both from 
outside and from within the discipline. Many scholars find the 
continued focus of mainstream comparative law on "function, 
efficiency, or linear history" to be unsatisfactory.9 Others observe 
that comparative law is "a mainly ethnocentric enterprise without 
6. COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note I, at v. 
7. Edward J. Eberle, The Methodology of Comparative Law, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REv. 51, 72 (2011). 
8. /d. at 51. 
9. Igor Stramignoni, The King's One Too Many Eyes: Language, Thought, and 
Comparative Law, 2002 UTAH L. REv. 739, 739. 
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self-critical discipline that usually generated boredom rather than 
excitement."10 And as David Snyder put it: "Over the years, and 
particularly in the last decade, comparative law has been criticized 
for excessive doctrinalism, shuttered attitudes to interdisciplinary 
inquiry, timidity in approaching broad-gauge study, as well as 
tendencies to superficiality, triviality, obscurantism, and 
exoticization-not to mention claims of ultimate irrelevance." 11 
While the nature of comparative law has been changing12 in 
response to some of these critiques, these changes have only 
highlighted the existential angst of comparative law scholars, 
teachers, and users. The big questions vexing the discipline are at the 
forefront these days more than ever. Reflecting on comparative law 
in the age of globalization, William Twining criticizes comparative 
law for lacking adequate analytical concepts and tools to account for 
and "comprehend the transnationalisation of law and legal 
relations." 13 In addition to criticizing comparative law's narrow 
focus on state-based European private law, Twining calls for moving 
to a broader agenda of comparative legal studies in light of other 
research traditions. 14 
A. The Need to Move Beyond the Subject Matter v. Method Debate 
A threshold issue which itself occupies and shapes much of the 
debate amongst comparativists has to do with the question of subject 
matter versus method: "Does [comparative law] have a proper 
subject-matter, or is it no more than a method?"15 Esin Oriicii 
suggests that the identity of comparative law is pulled between these 
two alternatives. 16 Some view comparative law as "an autonomous 
branch of social science or science of legal knowledge," as "a high 
level analytical subject" and "an end in itself."17 Those scholars 
engage in comparative law in order to learn about legal rules and 
institutions in other jurisdictions, in order to understand other 
10. Giinter Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise: Identity & Politics in Comparative Law, 
1997 UTAH L. REV. 259, 260. 
11. David V. Snyder, Comparative Law: Problems and Prospects, 26 AM. U. lNT'L L. 
REv. 935, 936 (2011). 
12. Esin Oriicii, Developing Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, 
supra note 1, at 43. 
13. William Twining, Globalization and Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A 
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 69, 75-77. 
14. !d. at 84-85. 
15. David Nelken, Comparative Law and Comparative Legal Studies, in COMPARATIVE 
LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 3, 12. 
16. /d. 
17. /d. 
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societies (and one's own society) through law, in order to search for 
commonalities or in order to show differences and the difficulty of 
understanding and experiencing other people's law, regardless of any 
practical goals or uses of such knowledge. 18 In contrast, much 
current comparative law scholarship and practice utilizes comparative 
law as a method of obtaining knowledge for specific practical aims 
such as for harmonization projects and convergence of legal rules, for 
legislative and judicial transplantation of foreign legal rules and 
models, and for large scale development and law reform agendas. 19 
The explicit debate viewing substance and method as in direct 
competition with each other has somewhat subsided/0 since most 
contemporary comparativists have embraced a pragmatic pluralistic 
approach towards both the multiple purposes of comparative law and 
practice and the various comparative methods that can be employed 
in pursuing those goals.21 That pluralism, I would argue, merely 
represents a pragmatic compromise. By not exploring and fully 
embracing how comparative method and substance mutually 
constitute each other and further each other, comparativists have 
given up on the truly radical and transformative potential of 
comparative law. We can learn from the experience of feminist 
jurisprudence. Rather than viewing substance and method or theory 
and practice in a binary fashion, it has successfully employed 
theoretical investigations with real life concerns and advocacy to 
advance its political agendas.22 As we shall see,23 FLT is most 
relevant and most transformative when it challenges the dichotomy 
between knowledge (substance) and how we come to know 
(methodologyiepistemoiogy). 
B. What to Compare: Debates on Similarities and Differences and 
Criticism of Comparative Law's Focus on Private Law Areas 
Broadly speaking, the two core questions occupying comparative 
law scholars are: What to compare? and How to compare?24 As we 
shall see, each of these questions needs to be unpacked and critically 
examined for its methodological, epistemological, and substantive 
18. /d. 
19. !d. at 43. 
20. Nelken, supra note 15, at 12-13 ("It is over this terrain that a territorial war between 
comparative law and comparative legal studies is being fought."). 
21. See Oriicii, supra note 12, at 53. 
22. See infra Part V. 
23. See infra Part V. 
24. Oriicii, supra note 12, at 62. 
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implications. For example, a key issue within comparative law 
revolves around looking for similarities and differences between laws 
and legal systems.25 Harmonization and convergence projects seek to 
highlight similarities and advance seemingly universal principles in 
law.26 On the other hand, many comparativists express concern with 
overlooking local values, traditions and cultural approaches that 
"differently colour the definition of those functions" of legal rules 
and institutions, "the importance attached to them and the test of their 
successful fulfillment."27 
The concern for differences in comparative law resonates with 
broader debates about multi-culturalism, essentialism (Western, 
white, male), and assimilation. Comparative law continues to 
struggle with the relationship between relativism/multi-culturalism 
and universalism.28 Nowhere has this tension been more evident as in 
comparative law approaches to rule of law and development 
projects/9 or with regard to human rights.30 Asian, African, and other 
non-Western comparative legal scholars and practitioners are acutely 
conscious of how the traditional legal system classifications, such as 
the prevalent civil-law/common-law classification, focus heavily on 
private law, on law as rules, and are "too Euro-centric."31 In contrast, 
their experience points to legal pluralism and to understanding legal 
systems as dynamic and manipulatable in nature.32 
Similarly, feminist legal scholars and advocates build on their lived 
experiences as women, as women of color, and as women at the 
intersection of gender, race, class, sexual orientation, and the like. 
These lived experiences challenge the objective universal fa9ade of 
law and legal rules and deconstruct traditional dichotomies of private 
and public spheres, of objectivity and subjectivity, and of similarities 
25. Roger Cotterrell, Is it so Bad to be Different? Comparative Law and the Appreciation 
of Diversity, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note I, at 133, 134. 
26. !d. at 134-35. 
27. !d. at 136. 
28. !d. at 137. 
29. See, e.g., Frankenberg, supra note 10, at 270-74 (describing the conflicted Professor 
Y, a Western European scholar serving as a legal consultant to a codification project 
in post-soviet Eastern Europe). 
30. See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden, Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights, in 
COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note I, at 371, 371-74 (examining the 
tensions in the relationship between comparative law and human rights law). 
31. Nelken, supra note 15, at 7; see Esin Oriicii, A General View of 'Legal Families' and 
of 'Mixing Systems', in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note I, at 169, 170-
71, 181. 
32. Nelken, supra note 15, at 8. 
2014 Comparative Legal Studies and Feminist Legal Theory 357 
and differences. 33 These insights can, and should, assist comparative 
law address the similar issues facing it. 34 
Another area of more recent concern among comparativists has 
been comparative law's traditional focus on private law areas, which 
meant that areas such as family law were not considered proper 
subject to comparative investigation. While subjects such as contract 
law and property law are viewed as inherently a-cultural or a-
historical, where perceived differences can be overcome as there is a 
common core amongst all legal systems that can be harmonized, 
areas such as family law or other matters of personal status are 
viewed as tied to historical and cultural specificities that are not 
suitable for harmonization or transplantation between legal systems.35 
Recent scholarship is beginning to challenge that assumption,36 as 
well as the universalist culture-neutral pretense of so called "private" 
law, such as commercial law.37 Nicholas Foster, for example, 
stresses the importance of legal culture and history in understanding 
the differences in the operation of and attitudes towards commercial 
law even amongst countries otherwise viewed as belonging to the 
same legal family. 38 Here as well, comparative law can benefit 
greatly from feminist critique of the family, the market, the private 
sphere, and the public sphere.39 Post-modem feminist deconstruction 
of the private-public dualism and its connection to power relation and 
social domination is particularly poignant as we begin to investigate 
the relations between comparative law, knowledge, and the politics of 
power.40 
33. See infra Parts III-IV. 
34. See infra Parts III-IV. 
35. See OrUcu, A General View of 'Legal Families' and of 'Mixing Systems', supra note 
31, at 170-72, 181. Thus, most migration of legal rules and institutions, whether 
through involuntary adoption of a certain legal system during a period of colonization 
or through voluntary borrowing, often left in place pre-existing legal regimes of 
matters of personal status, especially when based in historical customs or religion. 
36. See, e.g., Masha Antokolskaia, Comparative Family Law: Moving with the Times?, in 
COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 241, 241-58 (acknowledging that 
differences remain, but nonetheless offers a vision of family law that builds on 
transnational notions of human rights and women's rights). 
37. See, e.g., Nicholas HD Foster, Comparative Commercial Law: Rules or Context?, in 
COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 263, 263-80 (discussing the 
significance of incorporating commercial law into comparative legal studies and 
providing specific accounts of the way history and culture shapes commercial law of 
differing countries). 
38. See id. at 277-79. 
39. See infra Part VI. 
40. See infra Part V. 
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C. What and How to Compare: Putting Law in Context 
Deciding which aspects of a legal system are similar enough and 
hence comparable to another legal system depends on how we view 
law more broadly. In asking "What and how to compare?," 
mainstream contemporary comparativists have followed the legal 
realists' insights into law and call for the expansion of the scope of 
comparative inquiry from a formalistic approach, limited to law on 
the books only, to a contextual approach examining how law operates 
within society. Classical comparative law has focused not only on 
private law but also on a very narrow concept of law: law as formal 
positive legal rules, such as black-letter law on the books.41 Much 
has been said about the need to move beyond legal rules and for 
looking at law in context. 42 A contextual approach examines the 
interpretation and application of law in practice-law in action-and 
facilitates a "better understanding of law and lawyers from other 
jurisdictions."43 Even more so, looking to context takes into account 
the experience of those using the law and those to whom the law is 
addressed, and allows us "to reach the realities of all forms of law as 
social practices.'""' 
Current comparative scholarship is rich with examples of "putting 
law in context," for example, understanding law within a wider 
social, political, and economic context.45 As a matter of fact, it can 
be said that such contextual approach is at the core of comparative 
law's functional approach.46 A functionalist comparative 
investigation assumes that law has a social purpose; consequently, a 
functionalist comparative approach seeks to discover "how different 
legal systems deal with similar types of [problems] in the context of 
their own societies" and to compare institutions that perform 
41. Oriicii, Developing Comparative Law, supra note 12, at 45. 
42. See, e.g., Eberle, supra note 7, 51-64 (arguing that "law ... cannot be understood 
without understanding the culture on which it sits"). 
43. Foster, supra note 37, 279-80; see Eberle, supra note 7, at 52. 
44. Twining, supra note 13, at 77; see William Ewald, The Jurisprudential Approach to 
Comparative Law: A Field Guide to "Rats," 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 701, 704--05 (1998); 
William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence(!): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 
U. PA. L. REv. 1889, 1973-74 (1995) (advancing the argument that in order to see how 
lawyers think in their own legal systems we need to compare law from the insider's 
point of view). 
45. Nelken, supra note 15, at 21. 
46. !d. at 22. 
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equivalent functions, whether or not similarly structured and whether 
legal or non-legal solutions.47 
It is safe to say that all comparativists are now "realists" in that it is 
widely accepted that any comparative endeavor, whether for 
intellectual or for practical purposes, should examine law in its 
broader operational social context. For the most part, however, 
mainstream comparativists do not challenge the meaning of "context" 
itself.48 One challenge of examining law in action, law in context, is 
"how to justify the choice of any given context."49 "Any choice to 
base our contextual explanations on one time or space rather than 
another carries implications and is rarely 'innocent."'50 Rarely do 
comparative scholars take the time to explain such choices. For 
some, this may be ideologically driven and for others the result of 
their own blindness to the fact that what they view as the neutral state 
of things is in fact informed by their own experiences and place in 
society.51 
More importantly, however, even those who put law in context 
often ignore the other way of relating law and context-that of 
finding the context in law. 52 This second approach takes a critical 
view of the relations between law and society and seeks to 
demonstrate how law helps construct society and it is not only society 
that constructs law.53 Functionalist comparativists and those calling 
to put law in context ignore the extent to which the social problems 
that law "solves" are themselves "culturally constructed rather than 
given."54 As David Nelken observes: 
We should not assume that societies being compared will 
necessarily face the same 'problems' and use law in some 
way to respond to them. We need to realise the extent to 
47. Nelken, supra note 15, at 22; Ori.icii, Developing Comparative Law, supra note 12, at 
51; see Stramignoni, supra note 9, at 749-50. 
48. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 37, at 279-80; Nelken, supra note 15, at 19-20. 
49. Nelken, supra note 15, at 25. 
50. !d. at 24. 
51. See infra Parts IV-V. 
52. Nelken, supra note 15, at 21. 
53. ld.; see also Nora V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change 
in Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 647, 647 (1998) (discussing how law can 
challenge society's status quo and bring about change). 
54. See Nelken, supra note 15, at 22. 
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which cultures 'socially construct' what they treat as 
problems, or the need to deal with them by using the law. 55 
Gunter Frankenberg is amongst the few comparative scholars 
calling on comparativists to "recognise ... law [as] a way of seeing" 
and amongst the few to engage in a critical examination of finding 
the context in law.56 He calls on comparativists to "discard the ... 
law-in-the-books/law-in-action distinctions" and acknowledge how 
we treat the "legal representations of local conflicts, contexts, and 
visions."57 Comparative law, particularly, Frankenberg argues, 
operates both to construe social norms and values and to reflect 
them. 58 
Similarly, feminist legal scholars and other schools of critical legal 
thought have long argued that law constructs society as much as 
society constructs law.59 Thus, for example, feminist scholars have 
demonstrated how differences that have been viewed as fixed and 
natural, such as gender related differences, are in fact socially 
construed and perpetuated in law.60 Moreover, it is the proclaimed 
neutrality, objectivity, and universality of law that helps perpetuate 
certain social structure and institutions that are oppressive to women 
and other disempowered members of society and reify the dominance 
of others in society.61 As we shall see, feminist scholars argue that 
law is a way of seeing which often serves as an oppressive force 
against subordinated communities in that it elevates particular views 
of the world and representation of events from the perspective of 
those who possess the power to have their version of reality accepted 
and treats them as objective and universal truth.62 
D. The West v. The Rest 
Acknowledging the dual role of comparative law to both construe 
and reflect social norms and values can be a strength of comparative 
law, positioning it to truly facilitate a "more nuanced understanding 
55. Id. at 22-23. 
56. Id. at 23. 
57. Gunter Frankenberg, Comparing Constitutions: Ideas, Ideals, and Ideology-Toward 
a Layered Narrative, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 439, 442-43 (2006). 
58. Demleitner, supra note 53, at 647. 
59. See, e.g., id. ("Law reflects and constructs societal norms and values."); Christina G. 
Ramirez, Book Note, 21 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 57, 57-58 (1999) (reviewing NANCY 
LEVIT, THE GENDER LINE: MEN, WOMEN, AND THE LAW (1998)). 
60. See infra Part III. 
61. See infra Part V. 
62. See infra Part V. 
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of ourselves and others."63 At the same time, if we do not examine 
our own implicit cultural value judgments, comparative law can be 
misused and perpetuate entrenched social and legal power 
structures.64 Nowhere has this tendency been more evident as in the 
relations between the West and the Rest in comparative legal 
studies.65 
Whether viewed as a separate discipline or more of a method to 
expand our knowledge base, one stated goal of comparative law is to 
facilitate better understating of, and to shed new light on, one's own 
legal system.66 In their seminal 1968 work classifying legal systems, 
Rene David and John Brierley stated that "[c]omparative law-and for 
many this is its principal interest-constitutes an indispensable 
instrument for a renewed study of our own legal science; it helps us 
to know, understand and penetrate our own law."67 Armed with 
comparative observations on the operations of law and culnrre in the 
foreign legal system, the comparativist can ask, "Is there something 
in the foreign culture that can benefit or lead to improvement of our 
own system?"68 
And yet, such mutual learning has tended to be quite limited in 
reach. More often than not, developed western countries have only 
been willing to learn from other westernized developed systems (both 
common law and civil law countries) which are viewed as similar 
enough.69 Comparisons with developing legal systems or the global 
south more often result in reinforcement of the advantages of one's 
own familiar legal system. 
In the developed western world, both those who see comparative 
law as an end in itself and those \Vho advocate its use as a tool for 
various practical purposes have tended to engage in one way 
learning. On many occasions, the study of other legal systems results 
in reinforcement of one's own familiar legal system. Even on those 
occasions when the comparative knowledge points towards certain 
disadvantages in one's own legal solution and to possible available 
63. Demleitner, supra note 53, at 647. 
64. /d. 
65. /d. at 653-54. 
66. See, e.g., RENE DAVID &JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD 
TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 8 (The Free Press, 
Collier-Macmillan 1968) (1964); Eberle, supra note 7, at 66. 
67. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 66, at 8; see also Eberle, supra note 7, at 66 ("Just as 
importantly, a look at foreign culture is just as likely to shed light on our own legal 
culture. In effect, we are holding ourselves up to a mirror."). 
68. Eberle, supra note 7, at 66. 
69. See id. at 53-55. 
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models in other places, the tendency is often to explain away the 
suitability of such models based on social cultural differences or, in 
exceptional cases, to import such transplants but only from other 
similarly developed western legal regimes. 70 This is most evident in 
comparative inquiries pursued for specific practical purposes such as 
harmonization efforts in the field of commercial law or rule of law 
development projects. 71 In most cases, the learning focuses on 
exporting western models to countries of the developing world rather 
than in the opposite direction.72 It is not often that we see projects, 
theoretical or otherwise, that set out to learn from the global south. 
Even if it can be expected that practically oriented comparative 
endeavors may be more one-directional in their primary outcome, at 
least comparativists should be open to the idea of mutual learning, 
open to be changed by the encounter, and open to connect and learn 
from the "other." In the same way that the foreign place and the 
other will never be fully accessible to the comparativist, Igor 
Stramignoni argues that comparativists cannot escape being change,d 
by the comparative experience. 73 While comparativists can never 
fully leave their prior self behind on their "travels,"74 having traveled 
they will no longer be the same as they used to be before. 75 What is 
needed is for comparativists to openly embrace the possibility of 
being changed by the experience. 
Why is it then that most contemporary comparative scholars and 
practitioners continue to marginalize the impact of the comparative 
encounter on both subject and object? A critical examination of 
comparative law as political practice may help shed light. In doing 
so, this article specifically problematizes how comparativists 
approach similarities and differences. This article examines the 
underlying dynamics of norming and othering and specifically the 
concerns regarding essentialism and cultural relativism.76 At a more 
fundamental level, this article suggests that comparative legal studies 
need to explicitly address the relations between knowledge, power, 
and ideology. 
70. See Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative Law Sets 
Boundaries, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 737, 741-42 (1999). 
71. See id. at 742-44. 
72. See id. 
73. See Stramignoni, supra note 9, at 766. 
74. See infra Part IV. 
75. See Stramignoni, supra note 9, at 766. 
76. See infra Parts III-IV. 
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III. DECONSTRUCTING SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Engaging in critical examination of finding the context in law and 
exposing the ways in which comparative law (and law generally) 
constructs social norms and values is particularly important with 
regards to the question of similarities and differences which occupies 
most comparativists and which has been said to be at the core of 
comparative legal studies. 77 Such critical examination of similarities 
and differences brings to the forefront the discourse of othering. By 
definition, comparative law "deals with and analyzes the other, [i.e.] 
the different."78 Feminist and critical race theories share with 
comparative law a focus on the different, the other, and have 
challenged the social and legal construction of sameness and 
difference-the dichotomization of self and other.79 They therefore 
assist comparative law in unpacking otherness and moving beyond 
comparative law's obsession with differences and similarities. 
The study of similarities and differences is at the heart of 
comparative legal studies. Often, comparative work has focused on 
finding similarities and differences in legally-oriented practices when 
comparing societies that are otherwise perceived as similar. 80 It is 
also valuable to find similarities in law in societies which are in other 
respects perceived as very different.81 While comparativists are quite 
aware of the ever-present difficulties of knowing exactly what is 
"similar" and what is "different," much of the discourse has focused 
on whether we should focus on similar genealogical roots based, for 
example, on the legal families taxonomy, focus on similarities in 
culture, as with the cultural families taxonomy, or focus on other 
political, economic, and developmental formants. 82 Not much of the 
discourse has focused on how we perceive similarities and 
differences. 
Comparative law's unstated normative methodology of us/here 
against which them/there are measured and judged is ripe for feminist 
critique, which has extensively engaged in deconstructing these 
77. See Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism, supra note 70, at 740-41. 
78. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Dealing in Difference: Comparative Law's Potential for 
Broadening Legal Perspectives, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 657 (1998). 
79. Id. 
80. See, e.g., id. 
81. See Cotterrell, supra note 25, at 134-35. 
82. See, e.g., Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's 
Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 6-8, 10 (1997) (proposing to classify legal 
systems based on the primary pattern of law amongst three competing patterns: rule of 
professional law, rule of political law, and rule of traditional law). 
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dichotomies, especially in the context of the legal relevance of gender 
differences. The impetus of most comparativists has been to focus on 
sameness.83 What has been missing from the discussion is the notion 
that "identifying similarity is possible only in the context of non-
similarity or difference."84 Comparison inherently involves 
differentiation. But, FLT posit, we perceive otherness through our 
contingent cultural lens. 85 In comparing, we invariably rely on our 
own unstated norms and values.86 Within comparative law, for 
example, the geopolitical identity of the comparativists has served as 
"the unstated norm against which the exotic other is viewed. "87 
Otherness, suggests FLT, is socially construed, contextual and 
dynamic. 88 FL T teaches us that how we perceive difference depends 
on who is engaged in observing and their own perspective. 89 
Women's experiences are living proof of this. Women experience 
their lives both as victims of oppression and as agents resisting it-as 
both subordinated by privacy and empowered by it-as both rational 
and emotional. One lesson from feminist jurisprudence lies in the 
rejection of simple dichotomies and the abandonment of the either/or 
that characterize our current jurisprudence. 90 
Initially, much of the feminist discourse has focused on not only 
identifying differences along gender lines as socially construed but 
also on whether such differences should be celebrated nonetheless.91 
83. Curran, supra note 78, at 666. 
84. !d. 
85. !d. at 667. 
86. Brenda Cossman, Turning the Gaze Back on Itself: Comparative Law, Feminist Legal 
Studies, and the Postcolonial Project, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 525, 526 (1997); accord. 
Antoinette Sedillo L6pez, A Comparative Analysis of Women's Issues: Towards a 
Contextua/ized Methodology, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 347, 351 (1999) ("It is 
important that a feminist who chooses to engage in comparative analysis learns to 
suspend judgment in analyzing differences. Differences should be viewed in their 
context and from a cultural perspective."). 
87. Cossman, supra note 86, at 526. See generally Nathaniel Berman, Aftershocks: 
Exoticization, Normalization, and the Hermeneutic Compulsion, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 
281, 282 (1997) (explaining that comparativists combat inherent exoticization when 
examining otherness). 
88. Curran, supra note 78, 666-67. 
89. N elken, supra note 15, at 31. 
90. See Cossman, supra note 86, at 543. 
91. The strand of feminism referred to as cultural feminism "emphasized relationships, 
the value of intimacy, the importance of mothering and caretaking, and other feminine 
activities." Martha Chamallas, Past as Prologue: Old and New Feminisms, 17 MICH. 
J. GENDER & L. 157, 162 (2010). They called for re-valuing of women's work, 
women's contributions to our culture, and for acknowledging the different voice of 
women. See id. at 158, 162, 165 (locating the three strands of "newer" feminist 
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Much controversy amongst feminist legal scholars surrounded on 
whether those differences associated with womanhood and 
femininity, which, the argument goes, have been denigrated and 
marginalized by the patriarchal hegemony to maintain the social 
domination of men over women, should instead be celebrated, 
normatively elevated, and used as a tool of empowerment. This line 
of discourse resonates with calls for cultural plurality and for 
recognition of the contributions that other cultures and traditions can 
make to comparative law. 
Rather than focus on the merit of valuing differences as much as 
we value similarities, contemporary FL T have begun to deconstruct 
the very terms on which the understanding of differences has been 
based, for example, the juxtaposition of similarities and differences 
as diametrically opposed to each other, as absolute opposites.92 
Instead, they argue that we acknowledge that similarities and 
differences are mutually constitutive; there is no self without 
differentiation from the other.93 For example, Martha Minow views 
differences as relational and "reveal[s] the unstated norms against 
which difference has been judged."94 
This feminist epistemology and methodology of deconstructing 
difference and recognizing its relational nature can be applied within 
comparative law as a way to begin to challenge its unstated norms 
and displace its ethnocentrism.95 For the comparativist, therefore, the 
goal should be: 
scholarship-partial agency feminism, intersectionaVanti-essentialist feminism, and 
postmodern/poststructural feminisms-as a response to the older "Big Three" strands 
of feminism -liberal, cultural, and dominance feminism). 
92. Compare Curran, supra note 78, at 666 (arguing the merits of valuing differences as 
much as similarities), with Cossman, supra note 86, at 543 (deconstructing the 
juxtaposition of similarities and differences). 
93. Cossman, supra note 86, at 543; cf Deseriee A. Kennedy, Transversal Feminism and 
Transcendence, 15 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 65, 89 (2005) (quoting 
Filomina Chioma Steady, African Feminism: A Worldwide Perspective, in WOMEN IN 
AFRICA AND THE AFRICAN DIASPORA (Rosalyn Terborg-Penn eta!. eds., 1987)) ("For 
women, the male is not 'the other' but part of the human same. Each gender 
constitutes the critical half that makes the human whole. Neither sex is totally 
complete in itself to constitute a unit by itself. Each has and needs complement, 
despite the possession of unique features of its own."). 
94. Cossman, supra note 86, at 527 n.2; see MARTHA M!NOW, MAKING ALL THE 
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 80 (1990); Martha Minow, 
When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal 
Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 111, 112, 
122 n.41, 175 n.212 (1987) [hereinafter When Difference Has Its Home]. 
95. Cossman, supra note 86, at 527 n.2. 
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to establish one's own identity by seeing the others as not so 
much like us, but rather us as very similar to them ... 
[i]nstead of taking ourselves as the yardstick, as the norm, 
we have to situate ourselves in the world in equivalent 
distance from the 'others' whoever they might be. 96 
The realization that similarities and differences are not mere 
observable facts but are to a large extent socially construed, and even 
more importantly, that the significance that we assign certain 
similarities or differences is not only socially construed but is in fact 
in the service of certain ideologies, is a critical lesson for comparative 
legal studies. Particularly in an era of globalization, when 
demonstrating similarity is often used to provide justification for 
harmonization and convergence of legal regimes, or when those who 
resist reform or relevant comparisons point out to unbridgeable 
differences, it is critical that we further examine these similarities and 
differences and question the political agenda behind them. First, 
however, we need to further examine the essentialist and ethnocentric 
stance from which most comparativists have construed similarities 
and differences. 
IV. A VOIDING THE TRAP OF BOTH ESSENTIALISM AND 
RELATIVISM 
Much of the critique and current angst of comparative law's 
treatment of similarities and differences, of self and other, focuses on 
the essentialist perspectives comparative law exhibits in both finding 
similarities and differences and in devaluing and disempowering the 
"different other." Comparative law and practice has been heavily 
criticized as imperialistic, as taking the place of physical conquest 
and colonization.97 Many have rightfully criticized comparative law 
as western-centric and ethno-centric. Even those who call for 
comparative law to focus more intently on non-western cultures and 
on indigenous people,98 often take an essential view of the other 
(benevolent as it may seem) and its culture.99 
96. Demleitner, supra note 53, at 652-53. 
97. See, e.g., Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra note 10, at 262 ("[T]he current 
rush toward codifications appears rather like a postmodern form of conquest executed 
through legal transplants and harmonization strategies."). 
98. See, e.g., Eberle, supra note 7, at 54-55. 
99. See, e.g., id. at 57 ("Law in action is quite important, even, to western culture .... 
Law in action is even more critical for nonwestern cultures, as here the law may be 
more a result of tradition, custom, or orality."). Id. at 57 (emphasis added). But 
western law is as much the result of tradition and custom as in the nonwestern world. 
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In contrast to the mainstream comparativist that is unaware of its 
own perspectivity, its own subjectivity, the post-modem 
comparativist may be too keenly aware of its inability to, on the one 
hand, fully know the other, and, on the other hand, to fully escape the 
biases of its self. 100 Such a comparativist agonizes over his or her 
identity, over the authenticity of his or her comparative observations, 
to the effect that any comparative insights offered are always couched 
in language of relativism and contingent knowledge at best. 
In his article Stranger than Paradise: Identity & Politics in 
Comparative Law, Gunter Frankenberg aptly juxtaposes these types 
of comparative lawyers: the "mainstream hegemonic self' and the 
"tragic self."101 The mainstream comparativist is typically 
represented in "the three major schools of comparative thought"-
classical comparative law, focused on classifying legal systems; 
better-solution/convergence comparativism; and comparative law and 
economics.102 All share universalist humanist aspirations and a belief 
in ideal transcultural law and are untroubled by the empirical and 
historical plurality of normative frameworks and cultures. 103 For the 
mainstreamers, the ability to compare and to know other systems' 
legal norms is relatively uncomplicated and unproblematic, not 
surprisingly so, as they share a strong bias about the superiority of 
their home western Anglo/European law. 104 At the same time, the 
mainstreamer rejects critiques of ethnocentrism because for the 
mainstreamer, law as he knows it is universal. 105 Hence, the 
mainstreamer "does not even need to export or transplant" the 
superior (hence universal) law of his home country, because 
"wherever he goes and looks, it is al\vays already there, if only in a 
similar or dissimilar, derivative or rudimentary form."106 
Epistemologically, the mainstreamer uses objective discourse to try 
and suppress his subjectivity and hide his paternalistic view-point. 107 
100. See, e.g., Eberle, supra note 7, at 60 n.17; Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra 
note 10, at 266. 
101. Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra note 10, at 266. 
102. !d. at 263. 
103. !d. at 263-264. 
104. !d. 
105. !d. at 264. 
106. !d. at 264-65. 
107. Id. at 263. A more detailed discussion of subjectivity versus objectivity and the 
epistemology of knowledge will follow in the next section. See infra Part V. 
368 University of Baltimore Law Review Vol. 43 
In contrast to the mainstreamer, the tragic comparativist is all too 
well aware of cultural, moral, and epistemic differences. 108 He 
recognizes the limitation and imperfections of his own legal system 
as well as his intellectual situated-ness, and therefore agonizes over 
not being able to genuinely know the other, let alone compare 
different legal cultures. 109 Acutely sensitive to ethnocentrism and 
legal pluralism and to the need to contextualize knowledge and 
values in light of power relations, history and culture, such 
comparativist is left with no way to make actual critical judgments 
and is tragically paralyzed. 110 Instead, the tragic comparativist 
engages in metaphoric rhetoric, cautions against the problems of 
comparability, and rejects all-encompassing explanations for fear of 
ethnocentric imperialistic impositions disguised as supposedly 
"value-free or objectively universal" standards. 111 
How then is the comparativist to avoid the pitfalls of both the 
mainstreamer and the tragic comparativist? How can the 
comparativist negotiate both essentialism and relativism? 
One approach, offered by Nathaniel Berman, calls on 
comparativists to revisit the traditional epistemology, couched in 
terms of merely trying to understand the other and often resorting to 
simplistic understanding of "culture" and "legal culture."112 Instead, 
he challenges comparativists to engage in critical comparative inquiry 
by radically flipping familiar comparative techniques on their head: 
"[I]n those contexts where the tradition would exoticize, normalize; 
in those contexts where it would normalize, exoticize; in those 
contexts where it finds infinite depths of meaning, formalize and 
fragment." 113 By resisting essentializing tradition and showing how 
both our own and others' cultures are not homogenized but rather 
"split, hybrid, and embedded in contexts of power" comparative law 
can become transformative. 114 
In imagining the Other, western comparativists often deal with 
seemingly unbridgeable and unknowable differences by exoticizing 
the Other, i.e. "view[ing] the Other as wholly different."115 In dealing 
with such exotic differences, some have advocated respect, i.e. 
108. Paolo G. Carozza, Continuity and Rapture in "New Approaches to Comparative 
Law", 1997 UTAH L. REv. 657, 660 (1997). 
109. Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra note 10, at 266-67. 
11 0. !d. at 266-69. 
111. /d. at 269. 
112. Berman, supra note 87, at 281. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. !d. at 282. 
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leaving the Other alone to its own (un-comprehensionable but non-
threatening) practices and culture. 116 In contrast, too often have such 
exotic differences been demonized as primitive and barbaric, to 
justify conquest in the name of civilizing the Other. 117 
A parallel response on the other end of the spectrum has been to 
"normalize" the Other, again both in "respectful" ways and in 
"dismissive" ways. 118 Respectful normalization values the 
contribution of the other cultures and traditions, and incorporates 
them (though often in a marginal way) into mainstream social 
structures and legal regimes. 119 Dismissive normalization highlights 
the similarity of such practices to "our" (normal) tradition, so that 
they do not pose a challenge to mainstream concepts and can be 
easily assimilated. 120 
Lastly, those who are weary of too quickly categorizing the Other 
as normal or as exotic, nonetheless view the Other as something that 
needs to be studied and interpreted in depth. Driven by this 
"hermeneutic compulsion," such scholars engage in an infinite 
comprehensive study of the Other, necessitated, according to this 
view, by the deep complexity ofthe Other. 121 
All three techniques essentialize the Other by treating its identity 
and its culture as a unified coherent entity (either exotically different 
from us or similarly normal), which we could only truly understand if 
we continue to pursue a deeper and deeper level of interpretation. To 
resist such essentialism, argues Berman, the comparativist should 
engage in splitting, hybridization, and politicization of both the Self 
and the Other. 122 
Hence, the exoticizer should normalize by recognizing that the non-
western Other is as split (by gender, race, class, and religion) as the 
comparativist's own society; by recognizing that the Other is not 
"purely" other but rather a hybrid identity inflected by the West, as is 
most often the case with legal systems of previously colonized 
societies; and by recognizing that the colonizer's own society is 
similarly inflected by that legacy, including the re-importation of 
mutated colonial legal exports. 123 Recognizing that both the Self and 
116. /d. 
117. /d. 
118. !d. at 283. 
119. /d. 
120. /d. 
121. !d. at 284-85. 
122. /d. at 284. 
123. /d. at 282. 
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the Other are similarly internally split and mutually constitutive of 
each other's legal system thus forces the comparativist to abandon the 
role of the outside observer and the pretense of "point-of-
viewlessness."124 The comparativist is not neutral. "Any description 
of the Other will always involve taking a position within the conflicts 
that structure the Other's system."125 The comparativist must, 
therefore, acknowledge the "political" in the "comparatative."126 
Similarly, using splitting, hybridization, and politicization, the 
normalizer should re-exoticize. But, rather than trying to re-establish 
and differentiate previously normalized (and assimilated) cultures by 
simply asserting their radical difference, we should at the same time 
emphasize their internal splits, for example, along gender lines; their 
inevitable hybridization over time, thus exposing claims for 
authenticity as ideological; and the power structures within that 
culture. 127 These techniques will also allow the hermeneutic to 
recognize that the infinite study of the Other may only lead to deeper 
error; the split, hybrid, and politicized Other may simply resist a 
totalizing meaning. 128 
Berman's approach demonstrates the important contribution 
feminist theories and other critical schools of thought can make to 
comparative law.129 Feminist epistemology, as well as substantive 
commitment, is particularly well suited to tackle the comparativist's 
existential angst head on. Feminism offers a critical epistemology 
that challenges traditional modes of production of knowledge, 
challenges a dichotomized discourse pitting similarities against 
differences, the West versus the Rest, the normal versus the exotic, 
and law versus culture. 130 
Feminism has itself faced criticism of ethnocentrism early on. 
Women, and particularly women of color, whose diverse lived 
experience did not resonate with the unstated white-upper class-
heterosexual norm of mainstream feminist theory and practice, have 
exposed feminism's own partiality, its own essentialist perspective of 
124. ld. 
125. Jd. 
126. See infra Part VI for an in depth discussion of theorizing comparative law as political 
practice. 
127. Berman, supra note 87, at 283-84. 
128. Id. at 285-86. 
129. Carozza, supra note 108, at 657, 661-62. 
130. See Elizabeth Anderson, Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology/ (last 
modified Mar. 16, 2011 ). 
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women and women's issues. 131 Feminism has faced similar criticism 
of its a-cultural stance as being inherently Western. 132 Third world 
feminists criticize the international feminist movement "for [both] 
excluding [and] essentializing the perspectives and needs of women 
of color and third world women" in particular. 133 
Feminist scholars are increasingly aware of the dangers of either 
extremes-the un-self-critical ethnocentric (akin to Frankenberg's 
mainstream hegemonic-self) or the hyper-self-critical cultural 
relativist (akin to Frankenberg's tragic self)-and have attempted to 
pave new paths, 134 calling on us to view the world from more than a 
single, reflexive position. Patricia Williams described this practice as 
the "ambi-valent, multivalent way of seeing that is ... at the heart of 
what is called critical theory, feminist theory, and the so-called 
minority critique."135 It is the "fluid positioning that sees back and 
forth across boundary,"136 and which has been the "daily experience 
of people of color and of women. "137 
Mari Matsuda, for example, suggests that we can avoid 
essentialism by adopting "multiple consciousness" and employing 
strategies of "consciousness-shifting" to pursue justice. 138 In 
consciousness-shifting, Matsuda refers to the ability to see that the 
law reflects a particular viewpoint, the ability to operate within that 
view, and at the same time the ability to critically extract one-self out 
131. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REv. 803, 
843-45 (1990); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and 
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and 
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 155-57 (analyzing the ways in which 
feminist theory and anti-discrimination principles obscured the "multidimensionality 
of Black women's lives" and introducing the concept of intersectionality); Angela P. 
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585 
(1990) (criticizing feminist theories for obscuring the voice of black women by failing 
to recognize the differences in experiences and reality for black women and for 
essentializing gender over race and class). For example, minority and poor women 
who have faced the challenges of working outside the home or have had the state 
intervene in their reproductive and child-rearing preferences experience their lives 
very differently from middle-class white women. See Cain, supra at 844-45. 
132. Cossman, supra note 86, at 526-27. 
133. Lopez, supra note 86, at 348-49. 
134. See Cossman, supra note 86, at 525, 527. 
135. Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal 
Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2128,2151 (1989). 
136. Jd. 
137. Pat Williams, Response to Mari Matsuda, II WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. II, II (1989). 
138. See Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as 
Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7, 9 (1989). 
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of that view. 139 The key point is not to simply see multiple points of 
view, but to make a genuine effort to see excluded and oppressed 
viewpoints and know the concrete lived details of others.140 
A similar approach offered by Deseriee Kennedy conceptualizes 
"transversal feminism" as a way to create diverse and inclusive 
feminist theory. "By emphasizing the importance and relevance of 
individual experience and perspectives, it reinforces the importance 
of anti-essentialism and intersectionality in developing effective 
feminist legal theory."141 Building on the work of Nira Yuval Davis 
on transversal politics, 142 Kennedy offers a methodology of "rooting" 
and "shifting."143 Rooting means that participants in a dialogue 
(political, cultural, or legal, for that matter) understand their own 
position in the world, and hence the unique (and incomplete) 
positionality of their perspective. 144 At the same time, they also try to 
shift by listening and putting themselves in the situation of others in 
the dialogue who are positioned differently. 145 Such shifting requires 
empathy. 146 It may not be easy to understand those whose 
experiences and values are very different from our own, but we can 
make a good faith effort to learn to identify with others and to allow 
ourselves to be moved by others. 147 
Of course, claiming to put ourselves in the exact shoes of the other, 
risks becoming as essentialist and unattainable as the current 
139. Jd. 
140. Jd. 
141. Kennedy, supra note 93, at 92. 
142. Jd. at 75-78 (citing the works of Nira Yuval-Davis including: Nira Yuval-Davis, 
Human/Women's Rights and Feminist Transversal Politics, in GLOBAL FEMINISM: 
TRANSNATIONAL WOMEN'S ACTIVISM, ORGANIZING AND HUMAN RIGHTS 275, 280-83, 
290 (Myra Marx Ferree & Aili Mari Tripp eds., 2006); NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS, GENDER 
AND NATION 88, 130 (1997); Nira Yuvai-Davis, The Cairo Conference, Women and 
Transversal Politics, 6 Women Against Nation 88, 130 (1997); Nira Yuval-Davis, The 
Cairo Conference, Women and Transversal Politics, 6 WOMEN AGAINST 
FUNDAMENTALISM 19, 21 (1995)). 
143. Kennedy, supra note 93, at 76. 
144. Jd. (quoting Yuval-Davis, Human/Women's Rights and Feminist Transversal Politics, 
supra note 142, at 275, 282). 
145. Jd. (quoting Yuval-Davis, Human/Women's Rights and Feminist Transversal Politics, 
supra note 142, at 275, 282). 
146. Jd. (citing Yuval-Davis, Human/Women's Rights and Feminist Transversal Politics, 
supra note 142, at 275, 283). 
147. See Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. 
L. REv. 769, 815 (1994) (quoting Kim L. Scheppele, The Reasonable Woman, 1 THE 
RESPONSNECOMMUNITY 36,36 (1991)). 
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(objective) standards. 148 At the same time, by trying to take the 
perspective of another, we acknowledge the partiality of our own 
perspective. 149 This forces us to question our own categories and 
assumptions and expose other power webs that may have not affected 
us as much as they have others. 150 At the very least, the impossibility 
of fully knowing the perspective of another invites a certain amount 
of humility and self-doubt when we try to gain knowledge. 
Acquiring this knowledge may, in turn, allow us to "glimpse" a point 
of view other than our own, or at least acknowledge that our own 
point of view is not the only truth and to open our minds to accept 
more than one, two, or even three truths in any given situation. 151 
Brenda Cossman's article, Turning the Gaze Back on Itself: 
Comparative Law, Feminist Legal Studies, and the Postcolonial 
Project, 152 provides a direct example of the immense potential of 
feminist theories to comparative law. Cultural relativism arguments 
accept that we cannot escape comparative law's inherent 
ethnocentrism, and therefore suggest that we abandon the 
comparative project altogether. 153 Cossman, on the other hand, 
argues that feminist insights can mitigate the essentialism-relativism 
debate within comparative law and offer a way out of the 
148. As Mari Matsuda points out: "I cannot pretend that I, as a Japanese American, truly 
know the pain of, say, my Native American sister. But I can pledge to educate myself 
so that I do not receive her pain in ignorance." Matsuda, supra note 138, at 10. 
149. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term- Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 
HARV. L. REv. 10, 60 (1987) [hereinafter Justice Engendered]. 
150. Martha Minow explains: 
[l]f you try to break out of unstated assumptions and take the 
perspective of [the "other"] ... You may see an injury that you 
had not noticed, or take more seriously a harm that you had 
otherwise discounted . . . [Y]ou will then get the chance to 
examine the reference point you usually take for granted. Maybe 
you will conclude that the reference point itself should change ... 
You may find you had so much ignored the point of view of 
others that you did not realize that you were mistaking your point 
of view for reality. ·Perhaps you will find that the way things are 
is not the only way things could be ... 
!d. at 72. 
151. See When Difference Has Its Home, supra note 94, at 129-30. 
152. Cossman, supra note 86. 
153. !d. at 526. 
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ethnocentric gaze by strategically turning the (ethnocentric) "gaze 
back on itself."154 
Cossman builds on her collaborative study with Ratna Kapur on 
law and feminism in India, 155 examining, amongst other things, how 
the legal regulation of women in India is informed by and perpetuates 
"familial ideology."156 The concept of familial ideology, however, is 
not as naturalized and universalized at it may first seem.157 "Familial 
ideology looks very different in the Indian context than in the Anglo-
American context."158 By interrogating, reframing, and recasting this 
concept we begin to transform the concept itself and open the door to 
turning the gaze of comparison back on ourselves. 159 We can begin 
to displace the hegemonic discourse of the West by insisting on 
multidirectional flow of the comparative analysis. 160 Thus, for 
example, instead of asking "what is culturally specific about familial 
ideology in India" (which retains the West as the unstated norm), we 
should tum our gaze and ask "what is culturally specific about 
familial ideology in Anglo-American legal system[]," (allowing the 
non-Anglo-American context to become a stated norm). 161 
Consequently, what is being compared starts to shift, and unstated 
monolithic norms are replaced with multiple stated norms. 162 This 
"in-between space" that "recognize[ s] and nurture[ s] cultural 
hybridity" may eventually allow us to differently inhabit our world 
and transform our gaze. 163 
To be clear, in turning the gaze back on ourselves we do not escape 
its specificity. By explicitly stating our previously unstated norms as 
well as opening the door to embrace other norms we still face the 
challenges entailed m having to choose between possibly 
154. !d. at 527. 
155. !d. at 527 (referencing RATNA KAPUR & BRENDA COSSMAN, SUBVERSIVE SITES: 
FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW IN INDIA (1996)). 
156. Cossman, supra note 86, at 531-32. 
157. See id. at 531. 
158. !d. at 536. In the Anglo-American context, as well as other industrialized, capitalist 
societies, the nuclear, heterosexual, patriarchal family-with entrenched roles for 
women as wives, mothers, and economic dependents-is the dominant household 
arrangement. !d. at 531-32. In India, on the other hand, the joint family is believed to 
be the dominant household structure. !d. at 534. The joint family concept itself was 
historically mainstreamed in by the British colonizers in India, and therefore itself 
represents the cultural hybridity of India rather than a "pure" authentic Indian culture. 
!d. at 534-35. 
159. !d. at 536. 
160. !d. 
161. !d. 
162. !d. at 536--37. 
163. !d. at 537. 
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incompatible normative regimes, social arrangements, and legal 
frameworks. We will still have to make normative hard choices. To 
do that, I argue, we will need to tum our gaze to comparative law as a 
political practice.164 
In sum, the broader strategic deployment of proposals such as 
Berman's and Cossman's within comparative law, and a way out of 
the essentialism-relativism quandary, lies not only in acknowledging 
our "subjectivity" and unsuccessfully (and impossibly) trying to 
escape it, but in deconstructing the subjective-objective dichotomy all 
together. 165 It requires us, therefore, to deconstruct our own 
"hegemonic grid" about the production ofknowledge. 166 
V. COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES, THE PRODUCTION OF 
KNOWLEDGE AND POWER: A CRITIQUE OF 
OBJECTIVITY 
"To compare things," observes Paolo G. Carozza, "we must be able 
to know what they are."167 Hence, we approach the problem of 
comparability differently depending on our approach to how we 
know and whether we can even know. 
As we have seen, a key critique leveled against mainstream 
comparativists has to do with the stance of universal objectivity they 
advance in their comparisons. Typically, for a mainstream 
comparativist, the (western) home law is the natural (superior) 
standard.168 Measured against this yardstick, similarities and 
dissimilarities "observed" through the comparative study mirror 
concepts in the comparativist's home legal system-the only relevant 
system. 169 
Unlike classical comparativists, who have been criticized for their 
cultural blinders, most contemporary comparativists caution against 
ignoring our own cultural biases when proceeding with the 
comparative endeavor. However, many proceed on the assumption 
that, once acknowledged, we can free ourselves from our subjective 
164. See infra Part VI. 
165. Cf Cossman, supra note 86, at 539 ("Not only does it require that the Anglo-
American feminist legal scholar recognize the partiality of her perspective, but it also 
directs her attention to the way in which that partial perspective shapes how the 
comparative knowledge is received and interpreted."). 
166. Carozza, supra note 108, at 661; Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra note 10, 
at 270. 
167. Carozza, supra note 108, at 660. 
168. Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra note 10, at 265-66. 
169. !d. 
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cultural biases, immerse ourselves in the foreign culture and study it 
with an open heart, and eventually step back outside of that culture 
and objectively assess the data obtained.17° Feminist insights, in turn, 
question the ability to divorce ourselves from our so-called 
subjectivity and, more fundamentally, question the subjectivity-
objectivity divide and the notion of an attainable universal, neutral 
and objective knowledge. 171 
Comparativists, like travelers, try to learn new things about the 
people and places they investigate and consequently to "shorten[] the 
distance" between the comparativists and the subject of 
investigation. 172 However, asks Igor Stramignoni, "[C]an travelers 
ever hope to meet whatever lies ahead of them on its own terms? Or 
do travelers risk, instead, remaining forever foreign-both distant 
from their own past and never quite close enough to whatever else 
lies ahead?"173 In reality, traveling is as much about encountering 
one's own past, as it is about discovering one's own foreignness. 174 
Comparative law is as much, if not more so, about learning the self 
anew as it is about learning the other. The risk is, of course, that our 
gaze of the unfamiliar other may "find" exactly that which we set out 
to find. Rather than ask whether comparativists can ever fully 
understand unfamiliar laws, institutions, or cultures, we need to ask 
whether comparativists can ever access the otherness of their own 
familiar past. "Can they ever go past certain differences that, upon 
closer inspection, might turn out to be not much more than a 
celebration of sameness?"175 
Instead of proceeding with the assumption that law or culture are 
constant realities that can be classified systematically, 176 we should 
recognize our own learning experience where old knowledge and 
new knowledge, knowledge of the self and knowledge of the other, 
interact and mutually construct each other. 177 More importantly, such 
170. See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in 
U.S. Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43,44 (1998); Eberle, supra note 7, at 52-
53. 
171. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural 
Defense", 17 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 78-80 (1994) (noting feminist scholars' 
discussions of how subjectivity and objectivity are opposed within the law and 
whether a universal rule oflaw exists). 
172. Stramignoni, supra note 9, at 740. 
173. Jd. at 741 (emphasis omitted). 
174. Jd. at 742. 
175. Jd. at 743. 
176. Giinter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. 
INT'L L.J. 411,415-16 (1985). 
177. Id. at416. 
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a learning process challenges any claims for universal truths and 
complete and objective knowledge. 178 
Objectivity is a fundamental precept of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence. 179 Patricia Williams observes how the opposition of 
objectivity to subjectivity constructs our theoretical legal 
understanding. 180 Our legal thought and rhetoric are characterized by 
the existence of "transcendent, acontextual, universal legal truths" 
that are conveyed through objective discourse."181 "The more serious 
side of this essentialized world view is a worrisome tendency to 
disparage anything that is nontranscendent (temporal, historical), or 
contextual (socially constructed), or non-universal (specific) as 
'emotional,' 'literary,' 'personal,' or just '[n]ot [t]rue."'182 The result 
is, as Letti Volpp points out, that our jurisprudence "fails to recognize 
the inherent subjectivity of legal standards and masks the oppressive 
force of the law against subordinated communities."183 
Williams and Volpp are not alone in pointing out the subjectivity of 
objectivity. As part of a persistent feminist investigation of the 
relationship between power and knowledge, many feminist scholars 
have demonstrated how particular views of the world dominate our 
discourse and production of knowledge. 184 These critiques question 
claims of "objectivity" and "neutrality" or statements with 
"universal" applicability. 185 The point is that "frequently what passes 
for the whole truth is instead a representation of events from the 
perspective of those who possess the power to have their version of 
reality accepted."186 
Martha Minow, for example, problematizes knowledge because it 
embodies certain social and political positions. 187 She joins other 
feminists in arguing ·that the unspoken assumption of objectivity 
masks the fact that knowledge is construed from the vintage point of 
the observer. 188 Reality is constructed from the unstated and biased 
178. /d. at 413. 
179. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 8-9 (1991). 
180. /d. at 8-9, 11. 
181. /d. at8-9. 
182. /d. at 9. 
183. Volpp, supra note 171, at 80. 
184. Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in 
Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J. OF WOMEN & L. 95,95 (1992). 
185. /d. 
186. /d. 
187. When Difference Has Its Home, supra note 94, at 174. 
188. /d.at175. 
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standpoint of the observer,189 for we cannot see the world unclouded 
by preconceptions. As Minow writes: "Inevitably seeing entails a 
form of subjectivity, an act of imagination, a way of looking that is 
necessarily in part determined by some private perspective. Its 
results are never simple 'facts,' amenable to 'objective' judgments, 
but facts or pictures that are dependent on the internal visions that 
generate them. "190 
This argument is not uniquely feminist. Feminists, however, have 
also exposed how our discourse of neutrality hides the lack of 
objectivity as well as the oppressive impact of the hegemonic view. 191 
The observer's perspective is also oppressive because knowledge is 
inextricably intertwined with social power. 192 Thus, social 
understandings based on "prevailing views" or "consensus 
approaches" express the perspectives of those socially positioned to 
enforce their points of view in society. 193 
The focus on the relation between knowledge and power allows 
Minow to question the categorizing of people based on purportedly 
objective and inevitable differences. She argues that the claim to 
knowledge manifested by the "labeling of any group as different ... 
disguises the act of power by which the namers simultaneously assign 
names and deny their relationships with, and power over, the 
named."194 Instead of being objective, any perspective presented as 
"the truth" excludes competing perspectives by the sheer power of its 
holder. 195 Because power relations are imbalanced and often 
oppressive, the namers can simply ignore less powerful 
perspectives. 196 Hence, "[t]he assignment of difference then marks 
the relationship between those who have the power to claim that 
theirs is the true perspective and those who have no such power."197 
In sum, what initially seems an objective stance may appear partial 
from another point of view. Moreover, what initially seems as an 
objective difference may in fact be an act of exclusion and 
subordination.198 In any event, the possibility of multiple 
189. !d. at 176. 
190. Justice Engendered, supra note 149, at 45 (quoting EVELYN Fox KELLER, A FEELING 
FOR THE ORGANISM 150 (1983)). 
191. !d. at 45--46. 
192. When Difference Has Its Home, supra note 94, at 128. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Justice Engendered, supra note 149, at 33. 
196. When Difference Has Its Home, supra note 94, at 128. 
197. !d. at 175. 
198. Justice Engendered, supra note 149, at 14. 
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perspectives undermines the notion of objectivity and "shows how 
claims to knowledge bear the imprint of those making the claims."199 
Catharine MacKinnon also uses seemingly natural and real 
differences-the differences between men and women based on 
sex-to question objectivity.200 According to MacKinnon, objectivity 
assumes we all see the same thing/01 that only one reality exists, and 
that this reality is not contingent on the observer's positioning.202 But 
if sex-discriminatory conditions exist for women, there are (at least) 
two realms of social meaning.203 Consequently, if women inhabit a 
sex-discriminatory reality, their point of view is no more subjective 
than men's.204 The point of this observation is that "social 
circumstances, to which gender is central, produce distinctive 
interests, hence perceptions, hence meanings, hence definitions of 
rationality."205 It follows, for example, that neutral so-called 
objective legal standards are inadequate to describe "the nonneutral 
objectified social reality that women experience."206 
The core issue, however, is not the plain inadequacy of the stance 
of objectivity to address socially constructed realities, but the 
oppressive domination of male power that is objective epistemology. 
MacKinnon writes: "[T]he male standpoint dominates civil society in 
the form of the objective standard-that standpoint which, because it 
dominates in the world, does not appear to function as a standpoint at 
all."2o1 
Objectivity as epistemology defines both the process of 
observation or acquiring knowledge and the content of that 
knowledge and the world observed.208 As the traditionally superior 
methodology for acquiring knowledge, we have seen that the 
epistemology of objectivity erects distance and a-perspectivity as its 
199. !d. 
200. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 229-30 
(1989) [hereinafter FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE). The implications of 
MacKinnon's insights are not limited to the inadequacy of gender-blind standards in 
addressing sex inequality. Moreover, although MacKinnon focuses on the role of 
gender in forming perceptions and women's reality, her observations are applicable to 
race and class as well. 
201. !d. at 231. 
202. !d. at 232. 
203. !d. 
204. !d. 
205. !d. 
206. !d. 
207. !d. at 237. 
208. !d. at 97. 
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methodological criteria.209 While the criteria of distance and a-
perspectivity appear to be general ways of getting at reality, rather 
than constructing it, they are in fact socially determined and devalue 
"perspective[s] from the bottom of the social order."210 
Moreover, the objectivist epistemology controls the content of and 
what will be viewed as knowledge.211 Objectivity "defines the 
relevant world as that which can be objectively known."212 It 
assumes the existence of an objective "knowable" reality which is not 
dependent on how or who gains that knowledge.213 
In light of our current gendered social hierarchies, the world which 
can be objectively known corresponds with men's reality.214 Since 
men control the world, they "create the world from their own point of 
view, which then becomes the [reality] to be described."215 The male 
epistemological stance, objectivity, does not comprehend its own 
perspectivity or that it presupposes the way things are.216 "What is 
objectively known corresponds to the world [as men live it, and can 
thus] be verified by being pointed to . . . because the world itself is 
controlled from the same male point ofview."217 
After exposing objectivity for its maleness, feminists exposed the 
divide between objectivity and subjectivity, as well as other 
dichotomies, as a product of male power. On the one hand, women 
have been sexually objectified; on the other hand, they have been 
devalued as creatures of emotion and subjectivity. Consequently, 
feminists reject the objective-subjective distinction.218 The goal is not 
to affirm feminine particularity and reject masculine universality, nor 
to reclaim female passion in place of male rationality.219 We should 
reject the division between objectivity and subjectivity, between 
reason and emotion, and between abstract and concrete, as well as the 
209. "To perceive reality accurately, one must be distant from what one is looking at and 
view it from no place and at no time in particular, hence from all places and times at 
once." !d. 
210. !d. at 99. 
211. !d. at 97. 
212. /d. 
213. !d. 
214. Id. at 121-22. 
215. !d. at 121. 
216. Id. at 121-22. 
217. !d. 
218. "Disaffected from objectivity, having been its prey, but excluded from its world 
through relegation to subjective inwardness, women's interest lies in overthrowing the 
distinction itself," argues MacKinnon. !d. at 120-21. 
219. See id. 
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discourse of opposites itself, because they are invented from a 
position of power to maintain gender hierarchy. 220 
We came to view the world in dualisms.221 These binary pairs 
came to be viewed as natural and neutral; they are mere tools 
describing a pre-existing reality rather than having been constructed 
by men to serve men's interests.222 Feminists exposed these 
dichotomies as ideological social constructs driven by male power 
that are far from being natural or inevitable.223 For example, if what 
we consider universal is in fact a particular perspective of dominant 
male power, then the distinction between universal and particular 
collapses.224 The subjective/objective dichotomy is similarly false, 
because the so-called objective truth embodies a specific subjective 
view from the social position of dominance that is occupied by 
men.225 Therefore, as long as men continue to control women and 
male preferences continue to shape our world and discourse, such 
dichotomies will continue to look "general, empty of content, 
universally available to all, valid, mere tools, against which all else 
fell short. "226 
Accordingly, law will continue to value objectivity and neutrality, 
and to marginalize particular perspectives as subjective and culturally 
biased. Similarly, comparativists continue to maintain the fiction 
220. We came to view the world generally as "a series of complex dualisms," such as 
reason and passion, rational and irrational, power and sensitivity, thought and feeling, 
and objective and subjective. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study 
of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1575 (1983) [hereinafter The 
Family and the Market] . 
Men, who . . . created our dominant consciousness [and 
discourse], have organized these dualisms into a system in which 
each dualism has a strong . . . positive side and a weak . . . 
negative side. Men associate themselves with the strong sides of 
the dualisms and project the weak sides upon women. 
!d. "Socially, men are considered objective, women subjective." FEMINIST THEORY 
OF THE STATE, supra note 200, at 97. Privileging reason over emotion or objectivity 
over subjectivity is traditionally male. The binary pairs, in turn, reflect the hierarchy 
of gender in our society-the privileged status and control of men over women. See 
The Family and the Market, supra, at 1575-76. 
221. The Family and the Market, supra note 220, at 1575. 
222. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 
687, 690 (2000). 
223. See id. 
224. !d. 
225. !d. 
226. !d. 
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that, in general, comparative facts can be objectively described from 
a neutral stance, rather than acknowledging that our experiences and 
identities always shape the way we perceive the world. This stance 
of objectivity serves to legitimize the status quo and to perpetuate the 
dominance of particular views from a position of power as the true 
representation of reality, while other constructions of reality are 
dismissed as untrue and undeserving of legal and social recognition. 
Comparativists must rethink how we come to know what we know. 
Each of us is a "prisoner of his own experiences."227 Since we cannot 
eliminate our prejudices, we can at least recognize them.228 Similar 
to feminist legal scholars, GUnter Frankenberg calls on 
comparativists to make a conscious effort to establish subjectivity.229 
Comparative work can benefit greatly from a critical attitude towards 
alleged universal categories and claims to authenticity.230 We can 
nonetheless engage in meaningful comparisons by distancing 
ourselves, as long as we question the neutrality of the comparison, 
factor in the impact of our perspective and experience, and 
understand how subjective our comparisons can be.231 This, argues 
Frankenberg, is "critical comparison."232 
The question then becomes, is it possible for feminist or other 
outsider constructions of reality to attain the status of objectivity 
within a legal framework that recognizes multiple realities? Rather 
than trying to attain the status of objectivity within a discourse based 
on the division of objectivity from subjectivity, I argue that we can 
strive to discard the male epistemology of objectivity and the 
dichotomies it entails and adopt a concrete, experience-based, multi-
perspectival epistemology and methodology.233 But the point is not 
that subjectivity is superior to objectivity. This alternative 
epistemology is not to be mistaken for replacing male objectivity 
with female subjectivity. 
We need to abandon the pretense of abstract objectivity and 
universal knowledge and adopt a multi-perspectival way of knowing 
227. Paul P. Dumont, Comment, Radke v. Everett: An Analysis of the Michigan Supreme 
Court's Rejection of the Reasonable Woman/Victim Standard: Treating Perspectives 
That Are Different As Though They Were Exactly Alike, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 
255,255 (1997) (citing Edward R. Murrow, News Commentary, Dec. 31, 1955). 
228. Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons, supra note 176, at 413. 
229. /d. at 414. 
230. /d. at 443. 
231. /d. at 414. 
232. See id. 413-16. 
233. Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 
1402 (1986). 
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informed by the detailed particularities of our lives. These 
particularities then "become facets of the collective understanding 
within which differences constitute rather than undermine 
collectivity."234 As Ann Scales observes, if the purpose of law is 
indeed to decide the moral crux of the matter in real human 
situations, "[i]t would seem obvious that law's duty is to enhance, 
rather than to ignore, the rich diversity of life. Yet this purpose is not 
obvious; it is obscured by the myth of objectivity which opens up 
law's destructive potential.'ms 
The myth of objectivity exemplifies the way in which knowledge-
itself an embodiment of power-has been used as a mechanism of 
exclusion and marginalization of those who do not possess the power 
to have their version of reality accepted. The abstract universality of 
the objective point of viewlessness in comparative law, and in law in 
general, treats the particular perspectives of the powerful as reality 
and defines other perspectives out of existence.236 In contrast, aware 
of the inextricable connection between knowledge and power, 
feminists practice a positive, inclusive, and empowering vision of 
knowledge.237 
Feminist epistemology values the multiplicity of perspectives and 
realities. It takes multiplicity to be constitutive of reality; it sees the 
relational web between dominant and subordinated perspectives; and 
it views different perspectives as always in flux.238 Feminist legal 
scholars have developed several versions of such multi-perspectival 
jurisprudence, but one message, captured by Martha Minow, unites 
them: "Only through the variety of relationships constructed by many 
people seeing from different perspectives can truth be known and 
community be created. "239 
Transcending our own perspective is not an impossible challenge. 
We can try and minimize the impact of the situated self by 
approaching our inquiry from an honest critical stance.24° For one, 
we should recognize that our usage of language as a means of 
observation and differentiation is itself rooted in our culture and 
234. FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 200, at 86. 
235. Scales, supra note 233, at 1387-88. 
236. See id. at 1380. 
237. !d. at 1388. 
238. !d. 
239. Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE 
LAW 24,34 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). 
240. Stramignoni, supra note 9, at 758. 
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history.241 Nonetheless, even if we are successful in deconstructing 
and transcending the hegemonic grid of self/other, of 
subjectivity/objectivity, and expose knowledge as a mask for the 
hegemonic exercise of power, how would we be able to make any 
normative hard judgments? What norm should guide us?242 
Here as well, FL T can provide useful insights to comparative legal 
studies. First, rather than merely deconstructing the hegemonic 
discourse, FL T offers a prescriptive vision, calling on us to explicitly 
examine our underlying substantive commitments.243 Instead of 
agonizing over identity, Frances Olsen calls on the comparativist to 
start examining his or her politics.244 Second, we should view our 
commitment to voice multiplicity and diversity as part of an 
expanded commitment to the true sharing of social power. Multi-
perspectivity is both an epistemology and a substantive commitment. 
It requires a dedication to making decisions based on genuine 
attempts at understanding the perspectives and social circumstances 
of others, to making choices with care and humility.245 Moreover, it 
requires a willingness to reach results that actually produce the 
sharing of power with the powerless.246 Comparative law, I would 
argue, is particularly suited to serve as a subversive practice on a 
global scale, marrying substance and method to re-envision national, 
international and transnational legal regimes. 
VI. ACKNOWLEDGING COMPARATIVE LAW AS POLITICAL 
PRACTICE 
"Who would have thought that comparative law might become an 
invasive political enterprise with considerable practical impact ... 
[a ]n ally of power .... ?"247 
Comparative law and legal studies present themselves as divorced 
from politics, "without either a political agenda or a geopolitical 
location."248 Even Frankenberg, who is a vocal critic of traditional 
comparative law, suggests that the politicization of comparative law 
is a more recent phenomena, which is tied to efforts by postcolonial 
241. /d. 
242. Carozza, supra note 108, at 662. 
243. See Scales, supra note 233, at 1387-88. 
244. Frances Olsen, The Drama of Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L. REv 275, 279 (1997). 
245. Jeanne M. Dennis, The Lesson of Comparable Worth: A Feminist Vision of Law and 
Economic Theory, 4 UCLA WoMEN'S L.J. 1, 10-12 (1993). 
246. See id. at 35. 
247. Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra note 10, at 260 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
248. Cossman, supra note 86, at 542. 
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colonizers, both national and supra-national forces, to transplant 
various aspects of their legal systems and rule of law in transitional 
economies seeking to participate in global markets.249 
Comparative law, however, has always had an implicit political 
feature to it both abroad250 and at home. 251 Comparativists old and 
new have just "carried the card of political affiliations" quietly.252 As 
David Kennedy points out, however, the lack of discussion amongst 
comparativists about comparative law as a political practice can itself 
be seen as a political position.253 As discussed earlier, the questions 
of law and context, of similarities and differences, of west and the 
rest, all support viewing comparative law as a political practice.254 
Frances Olsen agrees with Frankenberg's main critique: 
"Comparative law has become an invasive political enterprise and it 
is important for those engaged in it to be self-critical. Comparativists 
should recognize the power relations involved."255 It is the self-
249. Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise, supra note 10, at 260. 
250. See Carozza, supra note 108, at 659 (citing Jorge L. Esquirol, The Fictions of Latin 
American Law (Part 1), 1997 UTAH L. REv. 425 (1997), who shows how Rene 
David's classification of Latin American law in one way over another served to 
expand the liberal democratic European tradition). 
251. Comparative law has often been used to effectively reinforce or challenge the social 
and political discourse in one's home legal system. Amalia Kessler, for example, 
argues that American lawyers and scholars contrast European legal traditions and 
"commitment to inquisitorial modes" of justice and to bureaucratic judicial structure 
"in order to highlight the supposedly distinctive ... virtues" of the American legal 
system as committed to the protection of the individual from the state and to values of 
equity and justice. In this way, she argues, American comparativists have both 
shielded their institutions from any threat of reform as well as elevated the status of 
the legal profession. See Amalia D. Kessler, The Making and Debunking of Legal 
Tradition, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 129, 130 (2011). 
252. Carozza, supra note 108, at 659. 
253. David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and 
International Governance, 1997 UTAH. L. REV. 545, 626 (1999). 
254. See Carozza, supra note 108, at 659 (citing Esquirol, supra note 250, at 425); 
Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law, supra note 253, at 626. 
255. Olsen, The Drama of Comparative Law, supra note 244, at 278. Olsen argues, 
however, that there is a limit to how much of their own political agenda 
comparativists serving as law reform consultants can in fact achieve. Id. at 279. 
Comparativists may be able to utilize the comparative work to influence political 
development in their own countries, to challenge underlying assumptions and the 
status quo in their own legal system; they will not likely be able to successfully push 
such agenda in the foreign place in which they are serving as experts. Jd. It will take 
the people of that country to carry out social change. !d. So indeed, the comparativist 
has to know his or her political agenda in performing the comparative work, but also 
in order to serve some domestic agenda. !d. at 280. The hope is, suggests Olsen, that 
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conscious and explicit discourse of the politics of comparative law 
and of comparative law (and any law) as political practice, as an 
ideology of power, that marks the most important and promising 
contribution FL T can make to comparative legal studies. 256 
Critical feminist legal theories posit that the personal is political, 
that law's objectivity and universality is political.257 As Brenda 
Cossman observes, "[ w ]e make no claims to neutrality in our work, 
but rather begin from an explicitly and unapologetically political 
location."258 So what are the political locations of comparative law? 
In his article on Comparativism and International Governance, 
David Kennedy explores the roles comparativists play in international 
governance.259 Kennedy argues for situating comparative law within 
the broader problems of international governance, where it plays 
several important roles.26° Far from being disinterested outside 
observers, we should see comparativists for what they are: "people 
with ... political, professional, and personal projects of ... [global] 
governance."261 
Comparative law sees itself as specifically not about politics or 
governance projects.262 As such, for the comparativist, colonization 
and imperialism, global trade, or the migration of ideas and legal 
concepts are not projects at all, but merely facts and history serving 
as backdrop to his comparative understanding.263 The comparativist 
does not seek power or aspires to rule but rather seeks to further 
intellectual understanding. 264 
Take, for example, comparative law's traditional focus on private 
law. The most central comparative law stories told by leading 
comparativists, such as the difference between common law and civil 
law or the reception of Roman law, are perceived as private law 
stories, a matter of non-governmental ordering?65 They most often 
attribute the migration of particular legal rules to incidental 
borrowing and transplantation, to ad-hoc advancement of 
"including formerly exotic countries in the western regime of law might somehow 
undermine the hegemonic status of the West." !d. 
256. Carozza, supra note 108, at 662 ("There is no question that it can give us new ways to 
revisit the basic questions of comparative law and can generate important insights."). 
257. See supra notes 66--68 and accompanying text. 
258. Cossman, supra note 86, at 542. 
259. Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law, supra note 253, at 551. 
260. !d. 
261. !d. 
262. !d. at 554. 
263. !d. 
264. /d. at 556. 
265. /d. at 583-84. 
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autonomous legal expertise, or to the natural extension of broad legal 
land cultural families, rather than to a strategic political choice or 
struggle.266 In sum, private comparative law distances itself from 
governance. 267 
In contrast, Kennedy advocates seeing comparative law's concern 
with a-political intercultural and cross-legal understanding as 
comparative law's strategic (and hidden) project of governance.268 
To further develop his argument, Kennedy draws on post-colonial 
feminist critique of parallel dynamics of governance within the field 
of international law-the insight that international law's overt 
disengagement with culture (rather than viewing international law as 
one cultural form amongst many) is itself a form of governance. 269 
In order to uncover comparative law's connections to governance, 
Kennedy offers a rough typology of three broad geographic sub-
divisions270 and two broad methodological styles271 within 
comparative law. He demonstrates their different strategies of 
disengaging from governance, by either presenting their involvement 
as merely that of an outside independent expert facilitating someone 
else's project, or as purely an intellectual matter of developing 
knowledge (granted, often focused on reinforcing the uniqueness of 
western legal tradition, arguing about what is required to sustain the 
266. Id. at 583. 
267. Comparativists dealing with pubiic law similady distance themselves from 
governance. While private law comparativists maintain the fiction that private law 
has nothing to do with politics, public law comparativists are forced to recognize the 
politicization of public law, but proclaim to leave it to the politicians and the 
governing institutions. 
268. Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law, supra note 253, at 580-81. 
269. /d. at 578-80. 
270. Those focused on western traditions, i.e. first world countries; those focused on non-
western exotic legal systems; and those focused on universal frameworks. Id. at 593-
94. 
271. The "technocrats" are concerned with concrete harmonization/modernization projects, 
which require their comparative expertise, and the "culture vultures" view themselves 
as intellectuals and stress history and cultural specificity. /d. at 594. Consequently, 
the western tradition first world technocrat engages with harmonization projects, 
while the first world culture vulture tackles a variety of classic comparative law 
subjects. /d. Within the non-western exotic context, the technocrat focuses on 
development and rule of law projects, while the culture vulture pursues areas studies. 
Id. Lastly, the technocrat's project at the universal arena typically advances 
international economic law, while the universalist culture vulture focuses on legal 
families and universal private law. /d. 
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west against the rest, or observing what is universally human) and not 
a matter of politics or power.272 
Next, Kennedy unveils three key ways in which, he argues, 
comparativists participate in international govemance.273 All three 
demonstrate the broader argument, that not only are comparative 
law's methods and subjects of inquiry far from being fixed and 
objective, but that they directly serve to construe and perpetuate 
particular exclusionary normative frameworks and power relations on 
a global scale.274 
First, the comparative practice of "finding similarities" and 
differences, of exoticizing and normalizing, is itself a normative 
political practice.275 Comparativists facilitate the legitimacy of 
international law regimes, such as universal human rights, by 
negotiating the tension with cultural differences (either reassuring 
that some cultural differences nonetheless share familiar 
commonalities and can be accommodated or assimilated, or that they 
are so exotic that they should just be left outside the reach of 
intemationallaw).276 
Second, as we have seen, comparativists participate in the broader 
social project of constructing and perpetuating law in general as a-
political, non-ideological, and separate from power structures within 
society.277 For example, study of foreign legal systems is often used 
to legitimize the domestic operations of law and to reinforce the 
social and political discourse in one's home legal system.278 Amalia 
Kessler argues that American lawyers and scholars contrast European 
legal traditions and commitment to inquisitorial modes of justice and 
to bureaucratic judicial structure in order to highlight the supposedly 
distinctive virtues of the American legal system as committed to the 
protection of the individual from the state and to values of equity and 
justice.279 Such discourse of equity, justice, and individual rights in 
America masks the prevailing social structures of domination and 
disempowerment of certain members of American society, such as 
women and racial and ethnic minorities, and helps deflect calls for 
reform to the American justice system.280 
272. See id. at 595-606. 
273. /d. at 614-15. 
274. See id. 
275. See id. at 614-18. 
276. See id. at 615-21. 
277. See id. at 629-33. 
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Third, comparativists play a direct ideological and practical role in 
constructing and perpetuating a VISIOn of private law as 
depoliticized.281 Whether in the form of harmonization projects 
among developed nations or through private law transplants in the 
developing world, such private law constitutes a sort of seemingly a-
political international regime outside the sphere of sovereignty and 
traditional international law.282 However, developing a system of 
rules to be implemented by the market and commercial actors without 
state intervention is itself a governance project.283 
As feminist critique of the private and the public has demonstrated, 
the allocation of certain areas to private law or to public law, the 
separation of the market and the family, and the distinction between 
intervention and non-intervention in private relations are directly tied 
to power relations between men and women and have been a 
particularly effective way in which law constructs and perpetuates 
power structures within society while appearing as neutral, natural, 
and a-political. 
In light of the predominance of the public-private dichotomy and of 
privacy in legal and social discourse, it is not surprising that the 
public-private dichotomy has been central to FLT.284 Feminists have 
exposed the ideology inherently embedded in the notion of privacy 
and the public-private dichotomy. "Privacy is not a coherent concept 
and it does not lead to any indisputable policy choices" writes 
Frances Olsen.285 Elsewhere she explains that '"[p]rivate' is not a 
natural attribute nor descriptive in a factual sense, but rather is a 
political and contestable designation,"286 a normative designation of 
how things should be treated, 287 fueled and informed by struggles 
over power.Z88 Struggles over the meaning of gender and the role of 
281. Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law, supra note 253, at 622-29. 
282. !d. at 623. 
283. !d. at 624. 
284. Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281, 281 (S.I. Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 1983). 
285. Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
835, 862 n.73 (1985) [hereinafter The Myth]. 
286. Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 319 (1993) [hereinafter Public/Private 
Distinction]. 
287. !d. at 320 n.2; see also Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 
45 STAN. L. REv. 1, 4 (1992) ("[T]he terms 'private' and 'public' occur in various 
senses, which are distinct though interrelated . . . these terms typically have both 
descriptive and normative meanings."). 
288. Public/Private Distinction, supra note 286, at 320. 
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men and women in society particularly construe and inform the 
public/private divide; men's sphere is the public sphere whereas 
women are relegated to the private sphere.289 
Feminist theories have advanced several lines of critique of the 
public/private dichotomy.290 Of particular insight to comparativists 
are the challenges leveled against the public-private distinction 
altogether, arguing that law or the state actually determine what is 
public and what is private. Rather than focusing on where and how 
we draw the public-private line, some feminist scholars, including 
myself, question the public-private dichotomy altogether and reject 
the notion of sharp demarcation between public and private. 
"'Private' and 'public' exist on a continuum."291 
Frances Olsen has consistently argued that the public-private 
dichotomy is false and that the state is constantly implicated in the 
private sphere.292 She illustrates this point by focusing on state 
intervention in the family, arguing that the terms intervention and 
nonintervention, are largely meaningless.293 Because the state is 
implicated in the formation, functioning, and distribution of power 
within the family, it is meaningless to ask whether the state does or 
does not intervene in the family. 294 On the other hand, the use of the 
terms intervention and nonintervention masks the policy choices the 
state is making.295 According to Olsen, whichever family status quo 
the state chooses to support, its choice is a political choice that 
289. Margaret A. Baldwin, Public Women and the Feminist State, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 
47, 61 (1997). 
290. Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75 
CHI.-KENTL. REV. 847,847 (2000). 
291. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 973, 977 (1991) 
(observing that "[t]here is no realm of personal and family life that exists totally 
separate from the reach of the state. The state defines both the family, the so-called 
private sphere, and the market, the so-called public sphere."). Similarly, Deborah 
Rhode argues that empirically, "[t]he dichotomy of 'separate spheres' has always been 
illusory. The state determines what counts as private and what forms of intimacy 
deserve public recognition." Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. 
L. REv. 1181, 1187 (1994). Public opportunities and policies concerning tax, welfare, 
and childcare shape private choices just as private family considerations constrain 
public participation in the workplace. !d. 
292. See The Family and the Market, supra note 220, at 1508; The Myth, supra note 285, at 
842; Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105, 113 (1989). 
293. The Myth, supra note 285, at 842. 
294. !d. at 837, 842. 
295. See Schneider, supra note 291, at 985 ("Although social failure to respond to 
problems of battered women has been justified on grounds of privacy, this failure to 
respond is an affirmative political decision that has serious public consequences. The 
rationale of privacy masks the political nature of the decision."). 
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impacts the family power dynamics?96 Consequently, after exposing 
the malleability of the public-private distinction, one comes to the 
realization that the state should not be allowed to justify unjust 
actions and policies based on an imaginary public-private line.297 
Feminist critics have similarly challenged the use of the public-
private divide to dichotomize the home and the family against the 
marketplace.298 Olsen, for example, focuses on the distinction 
between the privateness of families (women's sphere) and the 
publicness of markets (men's sphere).299 The dichotomization of 
market and family pervades our discourse and our culture to the 
extent that we tend to forget that our family and market arrangements 
are human creations.300 Thus, we must reject the family-market 
dichotomy in order to resolve real conflicts.301 
If law and culture then serve to construe both family and market, 
serve to define the scope and the line demarcating and differentiating 
personal relations from commercial relations, there is nothing 
inherently more or less comparable between the different legal 
regimes of contracts or property as opposed to family law. Nothing 
in the so-called private areas of law that makes them more suitable 
for harmonization or transplantation between different legal orders as 
opposed to the other aspects of law that seem incomparable, resisting 
convergence, because they are within the public sphere of culture and 
tradition. Whether engaged in harmonization projects among 
industrialized economies or in the export of legal models to the 
developing world, comparativists should acknowledge that such 
private law is part of the global public agenda and should critically 
investigate the implications of for.varding such agenda. 
In sum, those engaged in comparative legal studies and in 
comparative projects need to be self-critical and recognize the power 
relations involved, whether we engage in harmonization and rule of 
law projects or in the seemingly mere intellectual projects of 
understanding and migration of ideas and legal concepts. It is such 
296. The Myth, supra note 285, at 843. 
297. Public/Private Distinction, supra note 286, at 324-25. 
298. The Family and the Market, supra note 220, at 1498. 
299. Jd. 
300. Jd. at 1566. Even more so, the division of the world into separate public and private 
spheres facilitates the oppression of women. Especially with regards to the 
embodiment of the private sphere in the home and the family, feminists have argued 
that privacy doctrine "shelters from state regulation a domain in which women have 
unequal power and are physically vulnerable." Higgins, supra note 290, at 850. 
301. The Family and the Market, supra note 220, at 1567-68. 
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self-conscious and explicit discourse of the politics of comparative 
law and of comparative law (and any law) as political practice, as an 
ideology of power, that marks the most important and promising 
contribution FL T can make to comparative legal studies. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Over the last few decades, comparative law and comparative legal 
studies have been amidst an existential identity crisis. Often 
criticized for lacking in theory, being Euro-centric and doctrinally 
oriented, questions abound on whether comparative law is indeed an 
independent academic discipline. Furthermore, even if better viewed 
as a methodological framework, there is no agreement on how to 
engage in comparative legal studies and what methodological tool-kit 
is available to the comparative scholar and lawyer. While all over the 
world many policy and law reform projects, harmonization projects 
and academic research endeavors flourish under the broad umbrella 
of comparative legal studies, they most often proceed with very little 
theorizing about the nature of the comparisons or consciousness of 
the inherent challenges that such comparisons entail. 
Similar to comparative law and comparative legal studies, feminist 
legal theories have been questioned both externally and from within 
on whether they represent a unified discipline with core values and 
methods of inquiry; have been challenged on the scope and goals of 
feminist inquiries; and have been criticized for being essentialist and 
ethnocentric. Rather than shying away from such challenges, 
feminists have embraced them as a way to move forward. 
Comparative legal scholars and lawyers could similarly benefit from 
embracing the multiple purposes of comparative legal studies and 
comparative law projects while recognizing shared commonalities. 
They could learn from FL T how to broaden the discourse and 
approach other legal systems with humility and a genuine interest for 
mutual learning of both the foreign system and one's own. They 
could particularly learn from FL T how to avoid the extremes of both 
ethnocentrism and cultural relativism, thus overcoming the fear of not 
being truly able to know the other legal system or to draw meaningful 
comparisons based on observed legal similarities and differences. 
Feminist jurisprudence about the production of knowledge and 
objectivity as epistemology can be similarly helpful for 
comparativists. Whereas traditional comparative legal studies present 
the juxtaposition of one legal system against another legal system 
(often one's home legal system) as an objective neutral scientific 
project, feminist jurisprudence exposes such epistemological 
standpoint of point of viewlessness as masking implicit biases and 
normative standards. Moreover, insights from feminist jurisprudence 
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also help shed light on the inherent political dimensions of 
comparative legal studies rather than the purported objective 
universal assessment of various legal systems and legal rules so often 
present in comparative legal scholarship and reform work. As a 
matter of methodology, the diversity of feminist legal theories and 
the ability to embrace multiple voices and experiences can help 
comparative scholars break down the binary discourse of west/rest, 
common law/civil law, and so forth. Feminist practices of 
perspective-shifting and of seeing ourselves as we see the other can 
further allow comparativists to recognize the partiality of their 
perspective and acknowledge unstated norms at the base of their 
comparisons. Such epistemology and methodology will allow us to 
re-engage in comparative legal studies in a way that is better suited to 
the era of globalization. 
Comparative law can and should move forward strategically in a 
transformative way. If comparative legal studies take all these 
insights from feminist legal theories seriously and truly build on them 
to dismantle entrenched categories and practices, we may be able to 
finally realize its ability to "challenge entrenched categorizations and 
fundamental assumptions in one's own and others' legal cultures" 
and fulfill its true potential for "sharpening, deepening and expanding 
the lenses through which one perceives law."302 
302. Curran, supra note 78, at 658. 
